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SECURED CONSUMER GOODS TRANSACTIONS UNDER
NEW YORK LAW AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Introduction
At the outset it seems appropriate to quote from a reporter'
of the Secured Transaction Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.' "No other Article of the Code proposes so radical a de-
parture from prior law .... (I)t proposes to integrate, under a
single system of legal propositions and a single system of ter-
minology, the entire range of transactions in which money debts
are secured by personal property. '4 Under present N-ew York
law, the rights and duties of the parties depend on whether the
form of the transaction is a conditional sale or a chattel mortgage
-on whether the secured party has retained title or conveyed
title.' The Code proposes a single set of rules based on the sub-
stance of the transaction.
In the ensuing discussion it is proposed to compare the pres-
ent New York law on chattel mortgages and conditional sales with
the Uniform Commercial Code in their application to consumer
goods financing, and in so doing to highlight the distinguishing
and similar features of the present New York law on security
transactions.
Because of the Code's complete change in terminology, it is
advisable to define certain basic terms used throughout. The
security interest is what is now known as the lien or retained title
in some species of personal property that the Code calls collateral.
The secured party is today either the chattel mortgagee or condi-
tional seller of the debtor, who is known as the chattel mortgagor
or conditional buyer.
The Security Agreement
The parties to the transaction may agree to have title in either
the secured party or the debtor.6 For the form of an enforceable
security interest, the Code requires that.the debtor sign a security
agreement containing a simple description of the collateral.7 For
1. Prof. Grant Gilmore, Associate Reporter, Art. 9, UNiFORM CoMIMCLAL COD.
2. U. C. C. Art. 9.
3. Hereafter to be referred to as the "Code."
4. Gilmore, The Secured Transaction Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAw
AND CONTEMP. PaoB. 27 (1951).
5. A chattel mortgage is a present transfer of title to the mortgagee defeasible
by the mortgagor's payment of the debt, and in default of performance by the mortgagor
the title becomes absolute. Parshall v. Eggcrt, 54 N.Y. 18, 23 (1873) ; Prudential Ins.
Co., 256 App. Div. 205, 9 N.Y. S. 2d 515 (lst Dep't 1939), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 595, 22
N.E. 2d 166 (1939).




states that lack legislation regulating the formalities of the written
contract, the description is the minimum requirement. However,
the Code" further permits individual states to legislate on the mat-
ter. In New York a contract to secure the purchase price of $1500
or less,1" in addition to naming the parties and describing the col-
lateral, must satisfy such formalities as eight and ten point type,
an itemized statement of the transaction, and the amount of each
payment with the place where such payments are to be made.1
It is the general rule in this state that a conditional sale agree-
ment or chattel mortgage is in all respects valid and binding be-
tween the parties when executed.12  The Code provides that the
security agreement "attaches" or becomes valid between the par-
ties when an agreement is made that it attach and value is given
and the debtor has rights in the collateral.3
Under the Code, after-acquired property clauses are effective
in dealing with consumer goods as additional security when the
debtor acquires rights in the property within ten days after the
secured party gives value, but are void thereafter. 4 The present
law in New York is different in that such after-acquired property
clauses are effective against the debtor without a restriction of
ten days for acquisition of his rights in such property. The
Code follows present New York law'8 in that a security agreement
may provide that collateral under it shall secure future advances.' 7
Filing
The place of filing under the proposed Code'8 corresponds to
present provisions of the New York law. 9 Both state that where
the collateral is consumer goods, filing is to be made in the place
of the debtor's residence,- -and if the debtor is a non-resident, then
8. U.C.C. § 9-203 (2).. 
9. U. C. C. § 10-102 provides for specific repeal of all acts regulating chattelmortgages and conditional sales. It would seem § 9-203 (2) leaves the form of the
contract to the individual states. Thus uniformity as to form is neither sought nor
achieved.
10. Where purchase is not for commercial or business use.
11. PERs. PRop. LAW § 64-a; LIEN LAW § 239-i,.
12. Moore v. PrentiLss Tool & Supply Co., 133 N. Y. 144, 148, 30 N. E. 736 (1892).13. U. C. C. § 9-204 (1). The parties can by explicit agreement postpone the
time of attachment.
14. U.C.C. § 9-204 (3) (4).
15. Diana Paper Co. v. Wheeler-Green Elect. Co., 228 App. Div. 577, 240 N. Y.
Supp. 108 (4th Dep't 1930).
16. Brownw v. Kiefer, 71 N. Y. 610 (1877); Gray v. Brasee, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 687
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
17. U.C.C. §9-204 (5).
18. U. C.C. § 9-401.
19. PEms. Paop. LAW § 66; LiEN LAW § 232.
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in the place where the goods are to be kept within the state.20 If
the collateral is goods which are to be affixed to realty, then filing
is to be made in the office where a mortgage on the realty would be
filed.
The Code further states that filing made in good faith but in
the improper place or not in all the necessary places is good as to
any collateral in so far as the filing was proper and also against
a person with actual knowledge of the filing of a financing state-
ment which indicates that a security interest in all collateral
wherever located was intended.2
Present New York law requires the conditional seller, within
ten days after notice of removal of the goods from the original
filing district within the state, to another filing district of the state
(or from outside this state to a place within this state when the
contract has.not been filed), to file the conditional sales contract in
the district to which the goods have been moved. Failure to file
after notice voids the conditional seller's reservation of the prop-
erty as to purchasers and creditors of the buyer without notice.2
Dealing with this same problem the proposed Code submits two
alternative provisions.2 3 The first states that once filing has been
perfected in the Code state it shall remain perfected even though
the debtor's residence or the location of the goods is subsequently
changed to another county. The other alternative of the Code is to
the effect that filing becomes ineffective after 120 days if there is
no filing in the new residence or new location of the goods. 4
The present law25 may have the same effect in different situa-
tions as each proposed alternative provision of the Code. That is,
it may be possible that under present law the conditional seller
may never learn of the removal of the goods and thus filing, once
perfected, would remain effective even though the goods have been
moved.26 On the other hand, once the conditional seller receives
notice of removal of the goods, under present law he is met with
a time limit within which to act to maintain his interest in the
goods. Thus, the dubious result under present law, which gives
the purchasers and creditors of the debtor varying rights depend-
ing on the indeterminable knowledge of the creditor, would be
20. The Code does not attempt to solve the problem of ascertaining the debtor's
residence.
21. U.C.C. §9-401 (2).
22. PERs. PRoP. LAw § 74.
23. U.C.C. § 9-401 (3).
24. This is the only rule for goods brought into the Code state from another state.
U. C. C. § 9-103 (3).
25. PERS. PROP. LAW § 74.
26. This corresponds to the first alternative in effect.
27. This corresponds to the second alternative in effect.
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resolved one way or the other by enactment of either (but not
both) of the alternative provisions of the proposed Code.28
Some change in present law regarding duration of the per-
fected security interest would be effected by enactment of the
proposed Code. Under present law the filed chattel mortgage or
conditional sales contract remains valid for three years.2" How-
ever, a conditional sales contract may be renewed annually by
refiling within thirty days of the expiration of previous filing. A
chattel miortgage may likewise be renewed within thirty days of
expiration of previous filing.
Under the proposed Code a financing statement filed, showingthe date of maturity, will be valid until that date and thereafter
until it lapses.30 Any time after maturity, or five years from the
date of filing where there is no maturity stated, the filing officer
may notify the secured party that the security interest will lapse
if a continuation statement is not filed within sixty days.3 1 Thus,
the filing officer is given discretion as to when a security interest
will lapse since his power to give notice at "any time" after
maturity or five years may be interpreted literally and cause
serious complications not possible under present law, which makes
it the secured party's duty to refile within thirty days of expira-
tion without any notice from a filing officer. The continuation
statement need only be signed by the secured party identifying
the original statement by file number. When timely filed, the
effectiveness of the original is renewed for five years. After
expiration of this period the procedure may be repeated.
Under the Code, filing is perfectionla but the converse does
not hold. When filing is required, however, the security interest
is not perfected until there is a filing, except that if filing occurs
before the security interest attaches the security interest is per-
fected on attachment.32 Where filing is not a requisite for perfec-
tion (e. g., a purchase money security interest in consumer goods)
the time the security interest attaches is the time of perfection. 3
The New York statutes, not spealdng in terms of perfection, make
the security interest valid against third persons on filing.
28. Present law when requiring filing of a secured transaction specifies that thechattel mortgage or conditional sales contract itself must be filed. PERS. Pnor. LAW§ 66; LiE- LAw § 230. A motor vehicle chattel mortgage is an exception. LiEN LAW§ 230-c. The same is not true under the proposed Code. The security agreement itselfneed not be filed when filing is required for perfection-filing of a financing statement
is sufficient. U. C. C. § 9-302.
29. PEas. PRop. LAW § 71; LI.EN LAw § 235.
30. U.C.C. § 9-403 (2).
31. U.C.C. § 9-403 (3).
31a. Infra n. 34.
32. U.C.C. § 9-303 (1) (a).
33. U.C.C. § 9-303 (1) (b).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Perfection
The main purpose of a security arrangement is to give the
secured party a special, definite and exclusive interest in the par-
ticular chattel-an interest that the courts will recognize as effec-
tive against other creditors of, or purchasers from the debtor.
The contract which prescribes the security interest between the
debtor and the secured party, in of itself, will not usually bind
third parties; some additional act after the creation and attach-
ment of the security interest is necessary to "perfect1 3 the
security interest.
The rights of a conditional seller or a chattel mortgagee
against third parties are briefly prescribed by the Personal
Property Law and the Lien Law. Personal Property Law § 64
provides:
Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the
seller after possession of the goods is delivered to the buyer,
shall be valid as to all persons, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided. [Italics added.]
§65 continues:
Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the
seller shall be void as to any purchaser from or creditor of the
buyer, who, without notice of such provision, purchases the
goods, or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon them, before
the contract shall be fled . . . unless such contract is so filed
within ten days after the malkng of the conditional sale. [Ital-
ics added.]
In the Lien Law, § 230, it is provided:
Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mort-
gage of goods and chattel . . .which is not accompanied by
an immediate delivery . . . is absolutely void as against the
creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers
and mortgagees in good faith and for a fair consideration, unless
the mortgage is filed . . . [Italics added.]
It should be noted that the rules for the validity of chattel
mortgages and conditional sales differ under the present New
York law. Under the statute for chattel mortgages, where there
has not been a filing the chattel mortgage is void, and void as to
almost every conceivable third party. However, a conditional sale
is presumed to be valid and is only void as to certain creditors and
34. As in the 1950 Amendment to §60-a of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, the
term "perfect" as used in the Code, describes a security interest that cannot be defeated
by other creditors. A security interest is perfected when the secured party has taken
whatever steps are necessary to give such an interest.
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purchasers if there is no filing within ten days from the making
of the contract.
Under the Code there is a general validity statement reading:
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act or by other rule of
law or regulation, a security agreement is effective according to
its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral
and against creditors.'"''  Filing is necessary to perfect the
security interest as a general rule.36 But if the transaction gives
rise to a -purcease money security interest in consimer goods, filing
is not required and the interest is perfected against every third
party except a buyer without knowledge of the security interest,
who gives value, and who buys for his own personal, family or
household purpose.
7
Possession of the collateral by the secured party, without
filing, perfects the secured party's interest.38 This is the rule
under the Lien Law39 and under the Personal Property Law.40 It
is apparent that possession of the collateral by the secured party,
be he a mortgagee or conditional seller, is warning of some interest
in the one with possession; the purpose of filing is thereby satisfied.
The Code provides that an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor who becomes such
without knowledge of the security interest.41 The Code defines
lien creditor as one who secures the issuance of process which
within a reasonable time results in attachment, levy or the like-
the lien is effective from the time of issuance of process. 42  Com-
pare this with the Personal Property Law, by which an unfiled
conditional sales contract is also void as to a creditor who acquires
a lien without notice41L-the lien is not effective until there is an
actual physical attachment or levy.4" An unfiled chattel mortgage
is absolutely void as to creditors of the mortgagor even if the
creditor had knowledge45 and the claim hag not been merged in
35. U. C. C. § 9-201.
36. U.C.C. §9-302 (1).
37. U.C.C. §§9-302 (1) (d), 9-307 (2). Filing is required for perfection if
the purchase money security interest is in consumer goods that are part of the realty
or a motor vehicle required to be licensed. U. C. C. § 9-302 (1) (d).
38. U.C.C. § 9-302 (1) (a).
39. LIEN LAW § 230; Castlemen v. Pryor, 55 App. Div. 515, 67 N.Y. Supp. 229
(4th Dep't 1900), aff'd, 168 N.Y. 354, 61 N.E. 282 (1901).
40. P-as. PRoP. LAW § 61; Baker v. Hall, 250 N. Y. 484, 166 N. E. 175 (1929).
41. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1) (c).
42. U.C.C. § 9-301 (3).
43. PERs. Paop. LAW § 65.
44. Baker v. Hall, supra n. 40; Stallknecht v. Gilbert Appliance Corp., 144 Misc.
626, 259 N.Y. Supp. 189 (Co. Ct 1932).
45. LIEN LAW §230; Gandy v. Collins, 214 N. Y. 293, 108 N.E. 415 (1915).
Best v. Staple, 61 N. Y. 71 (1874). However, the unfiled chattel mortgage is valid against
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees who are not in good faith.
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judgment," although to enforce his right the claim would have
to be reduced to judgment and execution issued.
4 7
If the secured party under the Code files a purc7wse-money
security interest within ten days of his giving value, he takes
priority over the lien creditor whose lien becomes effective between
the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing. 8
This gives the secured party a more limited priority than under
a conditional sales situation where the ten day period operates to
cut off all intervening interests. Under the Lien Law there is no
such relation back.49
'When the debtor sells the collateral with or without the
authority of the secured party, the security interest continues in
any identifiable cash proceeds, and it is perfected if the interest
in the original collateral was perfected. 0 The perfected security
interest in the proceeds ceases to be perfected after the expiration
of ten days unless the original financing statement that was filed
covered the proceeds, or the secured party perfects his interest in
the proceeds (i. e., by filing or taking possession).5 The security
interest does not continue in the proceeds where insolvency pro-
ceedings have been instituted against the debtor; the secured party
has a right to the debtor's cash and bank accounts equal to the
amount of cash proceeds received within ten days before insolvency
proceedings were instituted less the amount of cash proceeds
received by the debtor and paid over to the secured party during
the ten day period. 2 The security interest after sale of the collat-
eral continues therein, unless the debtor's action was authorized
by the secured party, or the purchaser of the collateral is one
who takes free of security interests because there has been no
perfection or filing.58 The secured party may have only one satis-
faction; he may not claim both the proceeds and the collateral.
Under present New York law, when the chattel mortgagor is
in lawful possession of the property, and there is no express
agreement to the contrary, he may sell the mortgaged property,
subject of course, to the existing chattel mortgage ;54 and such a
46. Russel v. St. Mart, 180 N. Y. 355, 73 N. E. 31 (1905); Nucci v. McCullom,
194 Misc. 1025, 88 N. Y.S. 2d 619 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
47. SuOlivan v. Miller, 106 N.Y. 635, 13 N.E. 772 (1887); Karst v. Gane, 136
N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893).
48. U. C. C. § 9-301 (2). He also takes preference over a transferee in bulk.
49. Nucci v. McCullom, supra n. 46.
50. U.C.C. §9-306 (1).
51. Ibid.
52. U.C.C. §9-306 (2).
53. U.C.C. §9-306 (1).
54. Moore v. Prentiss Tool and Supply Co., supra n. 12.
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sale does not constitute a conversion. 5 If the mortgagee gives
authority to sell the mortgaged property, the mortgage cannot be
ehforced against the purchaser.56 The mortgagee has no right to
recover from a purchaser of the collateral for conversion where
that purchaser subsequently resells the collateral; 7 the mortgagee
must follow the property and recover it from the last purchaser. 8
The mortgagee has a right to the proceeds upon the sale if the
parties so agree 9 If a conditional buyer sells the personal prop-
erty without giving notice to the conditional seller, he is in
default, 60 and the rights and remedies of a conditional seller on
default take effect.
The general rule on priority among secured parties is that
conflicting security interests rank in the order they are perfected.01
Of course, nothing in the Code prevents subordination by agree-
ment of any person entitled to priority. The Code sets out
certain specific priorities between secured parties-priorities that
differ from the general rule of prior tempore.
A secured party with a perfected security interest who makes
subsequent advances to the debtor on the same collateral and under
the same security agreement takes priority as to the later advances
from the time when his security interest was originally perfected.03
The same is true where the secured party acquires rights in after-
acquired collateral; the priority is from the time the security
interest was originally perfected whether or not he advances on
the after-acquired collateral. 4 But if the conflict is with a pur-
chase money security interest, the purchase money security interest
takes priority over the security interest claimed under the after-
acquired property clause, if the purchase money security interest
is perfected at the time the debtor receives the collateral or within
ten days.65  Where there are conflicting purchase money security
interests, the interest of a seller or of a secured party whose
advance was used to pay a seller, takes priority.6
55. Hamill v. Gillespie, 48 N.Y. 556 (1872).
56. Schmidt v. Weeks, 142 App. Div. 83, 127 N.Y. Supp. 39 (3d Dep't 1910) ; Jel-
ferson Credit Corp. v. National Bronx Bank, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 333 (City Ct. 1950).
. 57. Hathaway v. Brayman, 42 N. Y. 322 (1870) ; Martin v. Lewinski, 54 App. Div.
563, 66 N.Y. Supp. 995 (2d Dep't 1900).
58. Ibid.
59. Skilton v. Codington, 185 N.Y. 80, 77 N.E. 790 (1906). Sale of mortgaged
property with intent to defraud mortgagee is a misdemeanor. PENAL LAW § 940. People
v. Koon, 275 App. Div. 991, 91 N.Y. S. 2d 332 (4th Dep't 1949).
60. PERS. PROP. LAW § 73.
61. U.C.C. §9-312.
62. U. C. C. § 9-316.
63. U.C.C. § 9-312 (2).
64. U.C.C. § 9-312 (3).
65. U.C.C. § 9-312 (4).
66. U.C.C. § 9-312 (5).
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An after-acquired property clause of a chattel mortgage,
otherwise .conforming to the New York Lien Law, is valid between
the parties.6 7 It will not be enforced against attaching and execu-
tion creditors68 nor a conditional seller of the after-acquired prop-
erty,69 but it will take priority from the date of original filing
against a subsequent chattel mortgagee of the after-acquired
property.70 An agreement that the chattel mortgagee shall have
his lien on the chattel apply to future advances is also valid,
71'
and the present state of the law indicates he will take priority over
subsequent mortgagees who expect to obtain a security interest
junior only to the original debt.72 By statute The conditional seller
can agree with the buyer that previous goods sold to the consumer
and not yet paid for, will be security along with the additional
purchases for the entire amount owing.
13
The Code74 provides that a security interest in goods which
are deemed to be part of the realty, takes priority over all prior
realty interests provided that it attaches before the goods become
part of the realty. Filing perfects the security interest as to
subsequent realty claims. 5 If, however, there is no filing, the
security interest will be subordinated
76 to: (a) a subsequent pur-
chaser 77 for value of any interest in the realty; (b) a subsequent
judgment creditor with a lien on the realty; (c) a prior encum-
brancer of the realty to the extent that he makes subsequent
advances. These same rules for fixtures apply to 
accessions. 1
It is still left to other law to determine what are accessions and
fixtures.
These simplified rules would replace those for conditional
sales and chattel mortgages that provide a different rule depend-
ing on whether the fixture was severable or not. If the goods are
so affixed as not to be severable without material injury to the
realty, the security interest is void against all who have not
agreed to such security. If the goods are severable without
material harm, then it is void after affixed only against subsequent
67. Supra n. 15.
68. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894).
69. Gridley v. Gates, 228 App. Div. 579, 240 N.Y. Supp. 260 (4th Dept. 1930).
70. Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York, 207 N.Y. 203, 100 N.E. 806 (1912).
71. Supra n. 16.
72. Carpenter v. Blate, 1 E. D. Smith 491 (N. Y. C. P. 1868).
73. PERS. PROP. LAW § 81.
74. U.C.C. § 9-313 (1).
75. In case of repossession, the secured party is liable for cost of repairing any
physical injury to the realty where the owner of the realty is not the debtor. U. C. C.
9-313 (2).
76. U.C.C. § 9-313 (1).
77. "Purchaser" includes "mortgagee." U. C. C. § 1-201 (32).
78. U.C.C. § 9-314.
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purchasers of the realty without actual notice of the security
interest unless it was filed where a deed to the realty would be
filed.79 The security interest is also void against the owner of
realty who is not the buyer of the goods to be affixed,"' even if




The rights of the secured party in the collateral after the debt-
or's default are the rights which distinguish the secured from
the unsecured lender. There has been no material change in the
provision for retaking possession on default, except that presently
the breach of contract must have been such that the contract
provided expressly for repossession8 2 whereas under the Code
repossession is a right of the secured party unless otherwise
agreed. In either case the creditor may proceed without judicial
process.8 4 The Code provides additionally, that the secured party
may render the equipment unusable without removal and dispose
of it on the debtor's premises in accordance with the Act.80
The creditor may give twenty to forty days' notice of inten-
tion to retake, which will cut off the debtor's redemption rights.8 0
If there is repossession of the goods without such notice, the
creditor is required to hold them for ten days during which time
the debtor, on payment of all sums due, may redeem and continue
the contract.8 7 The Code proposes that the debtor may reclaim
the collateral at any time before the secured party has disposed
of it.-8 Inasmuch as consumer goods repossessed must be dis-
posed of within ninety days if sixty per cent. of the cash price has
been paid,89 and reasonable notice must be given,"0 it is apparent
that the debtor is given a longer time to redeem under the Code.
The secured party on default may lease or otherwise dispose of the
of the collateral, as well as sell, with the secured party accounting
for any surplus; the debtor being liable for any deficiency unless
79. With certain formalities. See PEas. PROP. LAW § 67.80. Afadfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N.Y. 12, 166 N.E. 787 (1929);General Synod v. Bonac Realty Corp., 297 N.Y. 119, 123, 75 N.E. 2d 841, 842 (1947).81. The rules for accessions also revolve about severability without material harm.This is true both for chattel mortgages and conditional sales. See EAGR, CHATTELMORTGAGES AND CONDIMONAL SALES 107, 495 (1941).
82. PERs. PRop. LAW § 76; LiN LAW § 239-a.
83. U. C. C. § 9-503.
84. Supra n. 82, 83.
85. U. C. C. § 9-503.
86. Peas. PRoP. LAW §§ 77, 78; L mN LAW §§ 239-b, 239-c.
87. PERs. PROP. LAW § 78; LIEN LAW § 239-c.
88. U. C. C. § 9-506.
89. U. C. C. § 9-505.
90. U.C.C. §9-504 (2).
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otherwise agreed.91 The secured party may proceed at a public
sale or may make a privately negotiated transaction ;92 he may
treat the collateral as a unit or may divide it into parcels ;93 he
may choose the time and place, and the terms (cash or credit) ;
he may buy at a public sale and may even buy at a private sale
if the collateral is of a type which is the subject of, widely dis-
tributed standard price quotations.95 There are only two general
limitations which are imposed for the benefit of the debtor: (a)
reasonable notice must be given to the debtor;96 and (b) "every
aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, place
and terms, must be commercially reasonable. 
97
1 This is contrasted with the present twenty to forty day notice
of intent to retake or the ten day holding period." 'Under the
Personal Property Law,9 9 where fifty per cent of the purchase
price has been paid, there must be a public sale not more than
thirty days after retaking. The ten day notice of resale may be
given during the period of redemption.100 There are elaborate
provisions in addition to the notice of sale to the debtor, including
notice to the public.'0' A foreclosure action may be had for either
a conditional sale or a chattel mortgage.0 The advantage of the
foreclosure proceeding is obvious in that the sale and deficiency
are assessed in one action. This is one instance where no distinc-
tion is made between a conditional sale and a chattel mortgage. 3
In the case where the chattel mortgage is more than $1,500 the
only course is a foreclosure. 04
It should be noted that the Code does not restrict the disposi-
tion to a sale. 05 It is provided in the Personal Property Law 0 6
that where fifty per cent. of the purchase-price has not been paid
the seller need not resell the goods unless the defaulting buyer
91. U.C.C. §9-504 (1).




96. U. C. C. § 9-504 (2). Notice must also be given to any other secured party
who has a security interest in the collateral and who is known (or has filed).
97. U. C. C. § 9-504 (2). For "commercially reasonable" see infra.
98. Supra n. 86.
99. PEns. Parop. LAW § 79.
100. Eisenberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., 267 N.Y. 80, 195 N.E. 691 (1935);
Fisk Discount Corp. v. Brooklyn Taxicab Trans. Co., 270 App. Div. 491, 60 N.Y. S.
2d 453 (2d Dep't 1946).
101. Three notices in different public places and if more than $500 paid, a news-
paper notice of the sale at least five days prior to the sale.
102. LiEN' LAv § 206.
103. This is the modern tendency, for Lien Law § 206 became effective Sept. 1, 1952.
104. Lien Law §§ 239-a- 2 39-1 apply only to chattel mortgages of $1,500 or less.
105. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1).
106. Pans. PRop. LAW § 80.
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demands such sale within ten days of the retaking.0 7 If the
transaction is a chattel mortgage and eighty per cent. of the pur-
chase price has been paid, the mortgagee has the election of
taking the goods in satisfaction of the debt or an action for the
balance of the debt. 0 Thus it is apparent that the distinction be-
tween a chattel mortgage and a conditional sale under the present
New York law is important.
Under the Code, where the debtor has paid sixty per cent.
of the cash price'0 9 in the case of a purchase money security in-
terest in consumer goods, the secured party must dispose of the
collateral within ninety days." 0 The debtor has the privilege to
release his right to insist upon a resale, by a written agreement
to that effect made after default."' This will also release the
debtor from further liability.
If less than sixty per cent. of the cash price of the goods is
covered by a purchase money security interest and in the case of
all other collateral, the secured party in possessron after default
may propose that he retain the collateral in satisfaction of the
obligation. If an objection is made within thirty days, the secured
party must dispose of the collateral as provided by the Article ;112
if no objection is made the offer is deemed accepted."' The seller
is under no duty to resell if less than fifty per cent. of the price has
been paid under the Personal Property Law, unless the debtor de-
mands the sale within ten days."4
Conclusion
In conclusion there are certain essential changes that will be
wrought in commercial law that require value judgments.
(1) Presently the form of the security transaction controls
the substance; the Code abolishes this by creating one simple
"security interest." If the Code accomplishes nothing else it
107. Interstate Ice and Power Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95,100, 152 N. E. 476, 478 (1926) ; Moth v. Mfoldenhaner, 261 App. Div. 724, 726, 27 N. Y. S.
2d 563, 566 (3d Dep't 1941).
108. LIEN LAW § 239-d.
109. The use of the term "cash price" rather than "purchase price" will avoidlitigation on the matter.- See Ellner v. Commercial Credit Corp., 136 Misc. 398, 240
N.Y. Supp. 832 (City Ct. 1930).
110. Otherwise, the debtor may sue for conversion or for a return of the financecharge plus 10% of the cash price of the goods. U. C. C. §§ 9-505 (1), 9-507 (1).
Cf. PERS. PROP. LAW § 80-e.
111. U.C.C. § 9-505 (1).
112. U. C. C. § 9-504.
113. U.C.C. § 9-505 (2).
114. PEas. PROP. LAW § 80. There is no like provision for chattel mortgages in
the Lien Law.
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will be of great value for this one virtue. It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that the Code does not set up a single contract form for
security transactions which would have brought uniformity
throughout the forty-eight states.
(2) The Code allows "notice filing" by the filing of a financ-
ing statement in lieu of the security agreement. This will facilitate
the maintenance of records by the recording officer but will be of
greatest service to the secured party involved in transactions
where the collateral changes from day to day, i. e. accounts re-
ceivable and inventory financing.
(3) Today, on the removal of the collateral from the state
the security interest continues to be perfectdd until the creditor
receives knowledge of the removal and does not file in the new
State. Under the Code, perfection ceases unless perfected in the
new State, four months after the collateral is removed from the
State wherein it was first perfected. This clarifies the position of
a purchaser from the debtor-the rights of the secured party are
limited in favor of the bona fide purchaser. A more realistic
approach to the entire situation, however, would hold the secured
party responsible for a new filing upon the default of the debtor-
usually the only time there would be actual knowledge of the re-
moval of the collateral
(4) One of the greatest advantages to the secured party
under the Code is the possibility of perfection without filing where
there is a purchase money security transaction in consumer goods.
As a practical matter subsequent purchasers and creditors rarely
check the records before entering into a household goods trans-
action.115 Great savings on filing fees will be effected by the
.elimination of the necessity of filing..
(5) The Code simplifies matters concerning the secured
party's rights in fixtures; but it would seem that courts cannot
escape making distinctions regardless of the Code for they are in
the habit of'trying .to work out each individual problem on its
merits. In its attempt for definitiveness in this area, the Code
may be less elastic than the present situation.
(6) The restrictions on the secured party's freedom of ac-
tion in dealing with the collateral after default have been aban-
doned. In place of many of the protective devices against fraud,
there is only the safeguard that the secured party must observe
a standard of "commercial reasonableness'""'- a term of no
115. See C. P. A. § 665 (5) that exempts all necessary household furniture from levy.
116. U.C.C. § 9-504 (2).
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known legal meaning.'1 7  Nevertheless, it is only fair to add that
the aim of the default procedures of Article 9 is to promote dis-
position of collateral at the highest possible price, both for the
benefit of the secured party and the debtor, by providing for sale
through regular market channels rather than through public sale
where collusive agreements are not uncommon.
It is felt that the advantages of the Secured Transactions
Article of the Code outweigh its disadvantages. What is lost in
new and revolutionary terminology, and in spelling out too
minutely the rights and obligations of the parties, is gained in




ELIMINATION OF ACCRUED DIVIDENDS-COMPARISON
OF NEW YORK AND DELAWARE LAW
Introduction
Corporations emerging from a general economic depression
or the profitless first years of business are confronted with the
problem of heavy arrearages on cumulative preferred shares. To
the corporate management these arrearages constitute a mill-
stone: they drag down the market price of the corporation's stock,
thereby undermining any attempted venture to raise new capital
by sale of stock; they depreciate the corporation's credit status;
and lastly, the aggravate the impatience of the common share-
holders. Is there any legal way the corporation can shake off
this dead weight? The answer given by the courts of New York
and of Delaware is the scope of this comment.'
117. But see U. C. C. § 9-507 (2): "The term commercially reasonable includes,
among other things, obtaining approval of the secured party's place of disposition in a
judicial proceeding or by a bona fide creditors' committee or representative of the
creditors." The fact that a better price could have been obtained is not in itself
sufficient to establish that the sale was not commercially reasonable.
* The New York State Law Revision Commission will undertake a study of
the proposed Code before it is presented ta the New York legislature. N. Y. Times,
Feb. 9, 1953, p. 37, coL 5. It is contemplated that this study will be divided into three
phases: a comparison with present law, public hearings, and a recommendation to the
legislature. It is understood that this will not be completed for the 1954 session of the
New York legislature.
1. The historical background of this problem began in 1819. In that year the
U. S. Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Marshall. decided that a corporate charter was
a contract, protected by the Constitution from impairment in its essential form. Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819). Story, J., added that
